Intensified counseling, job search assistance and related policies have been found to be effective for labor market integration of the unemployed by a large number of studies, but the evidence for older and hard-to-place unemployed is more mixed. In this paper, we present key results for a large-scale active labor market program directed at the older unemployed in Germany. To identify the treatment effects, we exploit regional variation in program participation. We use a combination of different evaluation estimators to check the sensitivity of the results to selection, substitution and local labor market effects. We find positive effects of the program in the range of 5-10 percentage points on integration into unsubsidized employment. However, there are also substantial lock-in effects, such that program participants have a higher probability of remaining on public welfare benefit receipt for up to 1 year after commencing the program.
INTRODUCTION
Unemployed individuals aged 50 years and above have long been considered to be among the groups most difficult to integrate into the labor market. In many industrialized countries, however, demographic change has led to a higher official retirement age and a growing awareness of the labor market potential of older workers. In this context, the specific problems of older unemployed have been attracting increasing attention from governments and public employment services (see OECD 2006) .
In this paper, we estimate the effects of 'Perspektive 50plus', an active labor market policy (ALMP) program especially directed at long-term unemployed aged 50 years and above in Germany. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence for the effects of a comprehensive program focused on the re-entry of older workers into the first labor market. 1 Previous studies have identified the 1. The first labor market is defined as an employment subject to paying social security contributions.
German Economic Review 20(4): e436-e468 doi: 10.1111/geer.12174 effects of specific interventions, such as counseling or further training. Our study is concerned with a program consisting of multiple interventions and involving a large share of older unemployed nationwide. We look both at the intended effects of the program, i.e. the return to unsubsidized employment, and possible unintended effects, in particular lock-in effects. The program was introduced by the German government in 2005 and continued until 2015. The focus of the program was to re-integrate older unemployed quickly in the labor market using approaches such as job search assistance, coaching, skill assessment and short-term training. Before 2005, these approaches had not been systematically applied to older workers in Germany. The objective of the program was to end the neglect of older workers in labor market policy. The scale of the program was large and it was provided with substantial government funding. For instance, more than 280,000 unemployed older individuals participated in the program in 2010, which represents more than a fifth of the stock of unemployed aged 50 and above, registered as of June 2010.
The program was targeted at a group that faces severe integration problems with respect to the labor market. These problems stem from both the demand and the supply side. For a number of reasons, many companies are reluctant to hire older workers (Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heyma et al., 2014; Heywood et al., 2010; Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2014) . Moreover, older unemployed are often characterized by multiple placement constraints: they are often affected by problems such as bad health, a lack of mobility, low levels of formal education, skill obsolescence and a long history of unsuccessful attempts at returning to work. Arguably, integration often fails due to these obstacles to employment rather than due to the effect of age alone.
'Perspektive 50plus' was oriented toward integrating older long-term unemployed into the first labor market, that is, non-publicly sponsored, self-paying jobs covered by social security. This approach represented a significant change in German labor market policy. Before 2005, older unemployed had either been given passive benefits only, or they had been assigned to public-sponsored employment schemes. The use of public-sponsored employment schemes was discouraged by the government in the program considered here.
In our evaluation of the program, we make use of the fact that program participation was voluntary for job centers and geographical coverage was not universal, so that there are both participating and non-participating regions at the same time. Hence, a control group of workers in non-participating regions does exists. Based on survey evidence, we argue that regional differences in participation were mainly due to organizational and administrative reasons and, hence, can be taken as exogenous to program participation. Additionally, we use matching and difference-in-differences estimation and administrative data covering a wide range of observable characteristics. We address the validity of the assumption (inherent in these estimators) that selection at the individual level can be explained by observables only and confront the results with those of differencein-differences estimation, which do not rest on this assumption.
Our results show that there are positive and large treatment effects of program participation on integration in the labor market, but not on leaving public benefit receipt in the group of recent entrants to public means-tested benefits in Germany. We discuss the existence of displacement effects between participants and Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working non-participants, as well as the incentives for older unemployed to leave welfare receipt for other forms of social transfers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present evidence on the effects of job search assistance, coaching and similar policies on hard-to-place unemployed individuals. To be able to assess the appropriateness of the estimators, we give a brief overview of the institutional structure of the program in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 explain the methodology, introduce the data, and provide descriptive statistics. Section 6 contains results for the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) from matching and difference-in-differences matching estimations. Section 7 compares these results to intent-to-treat effects from difference-in-differences estimations. Section 8 concludes.
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON PROGRAMS FOR HARD-TO-PLACE WORKERS
This section gives a brief overview of and compares our paper with analyses of similar ALMP programs, i.e. job search assistance, coaching and intensified counseling programs and programs targeted at hard-to-place, and especially older unemployed. These policies are generally aimed at integrating the unemployed quickly into the first labor market and focus on specific groups (the older unemployed, the long-term unemployed, single mothers and unemployed with certain disabilities or other obstacles).
There is a large body of literature on job search assistance. In general, the majority of studies tend to find positive effects for services such as intensive counseling, short-term training, skills assessment, mobility enhancement and other types of assistance for populations including those on short-term benefits as well as unemployed individuals with placement difficulties (see, for instance, Ashenfelter et al., 2005; Graversen et al., 2008; Meyer, 1995; Van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006) . Similar conclusions were drawn in the meta-study by Card et al. (2010) . Kastoryano and van Klaauw (2015) found that job search assistance programs reduce the exit rate to work during participation; however, they noticed/emphasized that this finding may be specific to the group considered (unemployed primary school workers) and may not generalize to other parts of the unemployed population. Wunsch (2013) studied the role of job search assistance programs in optimal welfare-to-work programs. Her simulations of optimal policy designs showed that the main role of job search assistance is to delay or prevent situations in which it is no longer optimal to incentivize the worker to apply search effort and that, in line with existing policies, these programs should mainly be used at the beginning of unemployment and for short durations.
A number of recent papers deal with the effects of ALMPs targeted at older workers (for an overview, see Table S1 ). Boockmann et al. (2012) estimated the effects of hiring subsidies for older individuals on transitions from unemployment to employment in Germany using a natural experiment. Evidence for an employment effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in East Germany. For other groups, dead-weight losses dominate. Deuchert and Kauer (2017) tested the effectiveness of hiring subsidies for mostly older people with disabilities by the Swiss Disability Insurance using a small-scale social field experiment. Their results show that the subsidy may increase call-back rates in a group of older clients of job coaching services. Lammers et al. (2013) used a policy change in the Netherlands to study how changes in search requirements for older unemployed individuals affect their transition rates to employment, early retirement and use of sickness/disability benefits. Estimating various duration models and using difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity approaches, they found that stricter search requirements significantly increase entry rate into employment for treated individuals. Job search assistance and similar policies were sometimes found to be successful for older or otherwise disadvantaged workers in studies such as Arni (2015) and De Groot and van der Klaauw (2016). Arni (2015) used a social experiment for the evaluation of counseling and training policy, especially designed for older workers in Switzerland. He found that the policy increases the job finding rate in the treatment group and attributes this change to an increase in job search efficiency and a reduction in reservation wages. He emphasized that early interventions are important. The study is limited to unemployed who have entered unemployment recently. In contrast, the policy studied here is directed at long-term unemployed who have prolonged spells of unemployment. It is less clear that counseling has an effect on this group. From the methodological side, Arni (2015) had a relatively small number of individuals in the treatment (186) and control (141) groups, which limits the possibility to investigate the effects on subgroups of the population.
The literature on coaching and job search assistance uses different outcomes, for example transitions into employment or transitions into early retirement. This enriches the findings and points to the behavioral foundations of the results (Babcock et al., 2012) . Among the outcomes studied are unemployment duration, benefit duration (Arni, 2015) , exit to employment (Behaghel et al., 2014; Kastoryano and van Klaauw, 2015) , job stability and type of employment contracts (Arni, 2015; Cr epon et al., 2013) , reservation wages (Arni, 2015) and search strategy (Arni, 2015) .
Cr epon et al. (2013) studied a program for young jobseekers in France and put particular emphasis on displacement effects. In the ALMP evaluation context, a unique feature of this study is randomization at two levels: at the job seeker and at the job centers. This allows them to identify effects on non-treated individuals. The authors find little evidence for displacement effects. The presence of displacement effects may hinge on labor market tightness. That is, they may be large in those parts of the labor market where there is intense competition over few available jobs. If few employers offer jobs for older unemployed, displacement effects may be an important issue in our context.
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE OF THE PROGRAM
The federal program 'Perspektive 50plus' was introduced in 2005 in 93 regional job centers (i.e. local agencies responsible for activating and administering benefits to the long-term unemployed) across Germany. It was directed at unemployed aged 50 years and above who receive means-tested public welfare benefits Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working for individuals who are able to work (Unemployment Benefit II, UB II). 2 The program was introduced by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (BMAS) as a competition among job centers, which were called on to apply jointly as regional employment pacts (pacts in the following). These pacts had to submit detailed strategies on how to counsel older unemployed. They often involved local partners such as employers and business networks, non-profit organizations, health provides or volunteer networks. 3 This process mobilized resources at the local level, to advance creative solutions and to induce a competition for best practices. The federal level provided substantial financial means for the program as well as some degree of coordination, such as a platform for the dissemination of experiences through a series of regular workshops and conferences. 4 After the first program phase ended in 2007, the program was gradually extended by the accession of more job centers to the existing employment pacts. Figure 1 displays the growth of the program. In the year 2010, only 88 of the 438 job centers did not belong to a regional employment pact, which means they did not participate in the program. In the last stage of the program (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) , the participation rate was 95% among all job centers. The federal funding of the program has been terminated at the end of 2015, but many regional employment pacts have transferred the experience, structures and measures employed in the program to the general system of active labor market policy. Total spending of all regional pacts during the second program phase amounted to 787 million euros. Among these funds, 56% was provided by the ministry and the rest by other levels of government, either by the job centers' own budgets, from the federal states or from the 'Operational Programs' of the European Social Fund (ESF). The employment pacts' annual spending ranged between 1.97 and 44.3 million euros over 2008-2010, with a mean spending of 12.7 million euros. This shows that there is a great heterogeneity in spending between pacts.
The scale of the program can also be measured by the total number of individuals in the program. During the year 2010, the overall number of participants was 283,332. Among them, 188,817 received more than 25 h of counseling, training or other services in total (IAQ/IAW 2012, p. 7). Duration of participation differed across participants and employment pacts. In most cases, unemployed who were not integrated after 1 year were re-included in the general system of active labor market policies. The fraction of program participants among all older unemployed was substantial. According to the statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, 1.23 million individuals aged between 50 and 65 years received UB II in June 2010. 5 For the governance of the program, a specific mode was designed. Although ALMP programs are usually administered by the Federal Employment Agency, 'Perspektive 50plus' was implemented directly by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. A private service provider was contracted to coordinate the activities of the employment pacts and provide the monitoring for the program. The governance did not focus on detailed guidelines of the implementation of ALMP; rather, it provided financial incentives. Depending on the concrete agreement between the federal and the local level, between 75 and 100% of the federal contribution depended on the fulfillment of integration quotas; these quotas were negotiated in advance between the federal government and the employment pacts. 6 Local autonomy, decentralized implementation and governance by objectives were introduced by the federal program as new elements to German ALMP, which had hitherto been strongly shaped by the central control of the Federal Employment Agency over local branch offices.
Taking the number of integrations as a key indicator, the governance structure creates specific incentives for job centers to concentrate on individuals with better labor market characteristics, to include individuals which are known to transit to employment shortly and to exclude those who are known to leave the welfare system for the unable-to-work and other parts of the social security system. These incentives mirror those known from the US literature on performance standards (Courty et al., 2011; Heckman et al., 2002) . We take them into account by looking in detail at the composition of participants and non-participants.
5. See Federal Employment Agency (2010): Statistik der Grundsicherung f€ ur Arbeitsuchende nach dem SGB II, € Ubersichtstabellen SGB II f€ ur Bund und L€ ander, June 2010. 6. Within 'Perspektive 50plus', a separate module for the least able to work was set-up and named 'Impuls 50plus'. In this module, financing did not depend solely on the number of unemployed integrated, but on other, 'softer' indicators as well. In this paper, however, we are not concerned with this part of the program and only look at participants in the standard program.
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To implement the program, employment pacts and jobs centers used their autonomy and developed different support measures for the participants. Yet, there was a common approach shared by the employment pacts. Table 1 shows which individual measures were administered by the job centers. 7 The assessment of the jobseekers' skills was often the first step in individualized casework; it accounted for 14.2% of all individual activation measures. General job search assistance and coaching made up nearly 40% of all activation measures. There was also a substantial fraction of (short-term) training measures (12.5%). Interventions to improve health and mobility added a further 13.6%. Most notably, public sector-sponsored employment, hitherto a frequent element of ALMP for the target group of older unemployed, only accounted for about 3% of all program starts, whereas it accounted for roughly 30% of the program starts in regular ALMP for older workers. This underlines the orientation of the program toward integration into the first labor market, excluding public employment schemes.
The intensity of counseling and coaching received by a program participant is likely to be much higher than in the standard processes of the German public employment service. According to Boockmann et al. (2013) , unemployed with multiple placement obstacles (such as age) meet their caseworkers less often than individuals without these obstacles in the regular process. In addition, Konle- 7. In addition, participating job centers could use the instruments of regular ALMP, in particular, hiring subsidies, in the same way as non-participating job centers. Note that our outcome measure excludes subsidized employment (see Section 5). Our results are, therefore, not directly affected by differences in the use of these instruments for participants and nonparticipants. Seidl (2017, p. 17) notes that participation in ALMPs generally decreases with age. Thus, 'Perspektive 50plus' can be regarded as a substantial intervention with large potential effects on individuals' behavior.
ESTIMATION APPROACH
In the following, we estimate treatment effects for individuals who participated in 'Perspektive 50plus' during the year 2010 on integration into unsubsidized employment and exit from dependence on means-tested benefits. In the absence of randomization, we use different sources of variation in participation. First, we use participation at the regional level, comparing between participating and non-participating job centers and using the fact that not all job centers participated in 2010. Second, we also use differences in participation at the individual level.
Regional participation of job centers is important because relying on the individual participation only may result in a low fraction of comparable cases if access is very selective. Moreover, the control cases may be affected indirectly by the program if there is competition for scarce jobs within the same local labor market. In addition, caseworkers at the participating job centers will become informed about the program and may apply similar approaches to non-treated individuals. The case studies conducted for the evaluation show that there is evidence for the existence of spillover effects from the program to the regular operations of the job centers (see IAQ/IAW 2011, p. 84). For these reasons, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) would be violated if we chose control observations from the same local labor markets. Therefore, we drew a control group from individuals in non-participating regions. The SUTVA holds under the assumption that treated individuals from a participating region do not compete for jobs with control individuals from another (non-participating) region. 8 For the analysis, the participating job centers were chosen from those that entered the program in the second half of 2009 or in the beginning of 2010. There are several reasons for not choosing job centers with earlier access dates. First, we wish to focus on the first participation of individuals in the program. Second, individual participation information is available only for the year 2010, we would be running the risk of including individuals with repeated participations in the treatment group if we included job centers participating in earlier years. Third, we can use data of job centers that changed their participation status in order to perform either difference-in-differences (DiD) or DiD-matching estimations, using information from a period before they accessed the program (see below). Fourth, it turned out that the regional characteristics of newly acceding job centers are very similar to non-participating regions, while job centers 8. Previous research (e.g. Heckman et al., 1997 Heckman et al., , 1998 and Smith and Todd, 2005) has shown that using control observations from the same local labor market is preferable under certain conditions, such as the absence of substitution effects, which may not hold in our case. We have also used a control group from participating job centers and have also matched treatment and control observations from the same job center. Treatment effects are comparable in size to the ones reported here, although they tend to be slightly larger in magnitude. These results are not reported here but are included in IAQ/IAW (2012).
Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working which had joined the program earlier tend to differ in several respects, such as size and regional employment conditions. Table 2 shows the distribution of the characteristics between the newly acceding job centers and those remaining outside of the program. We used the standardized difference instead of significance tests as a criterion for differences between the two groups because the size of the difference matters for potential biases. The table shows that the standardized differences are small in most cases, in particular regarding the composition of welfare recipients.
In a standardized e-mail survey that was part of the project, we addressed potential policy endogeneity to check whether it would be feasible to use selective participation by job centers for identification. We asked non-participating job centers (from which our control observations are drawn) for the reasons why they had not joined the program. Multiple answers were admitted; most of them point to exogenous reasons for (non-)participation. Some job centers had intended to join the employment pacts but had had difficulties establishing contacts (27%); others had applied but had been refused entry (19%). Only a minority (18%) stated that they had not joined because they had 'no particular problems with the target group 50plus'. From the 27 job centers which gave other reasons, only one stated that participation was not worthwhile because there were too few potential participants. All others named organizational and administrative reasons. 9 Figure 2 shows the gradual extension of the program from 2008 until 2010. The program was implemented throughout Germany, with little evidence that participation differed between geographic areas. The map shows that the extension of the program was based on existing regional clusters. This reflects the fact that the number of regional employment pacts was kept fixed from 2008 to 2010 and extension occurred mainly when neighboring job centers joined existing pacts. Indeed, in another survey among the participating job centers, geographical contiguity was singled out as the most important factor for the admission of newly joining job centers (84% of all answers; multiple answers were allowed). We conclude that the benefit of having contacts to a nearby employment pact with the administrative capacities to welcome new members was the main driver behind the geographical extensions to the program after 2008. This can be considered exogenous from the point of view of the newly joining job centers.
We used several different non-experimental micro-econometric evaluation methods. 10 First, we use the data for the year 2010 and applied propensity score matching (PSM) to obtain a control group from non-participating job centers. In the matching process, participants are compared with non-participants that have a similar treatment probability. This probability is predicted at the individual level using a variety of characteristics (see next section). The estimated average treatment effect on the treated is: 9. We have used the survey results to exclude non-participating job centers which named reasons other than administrative or organizational. Results are available in Figures S3 and S4 . Since the differences to the results for the full sample are minor, we chose to report results from the full sample to avoid the loss of observations caused by non-participation of job centers in the survey. 10. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide an extensive discussion of the properties and assumptions of different non-experimental estimation approaches. Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working
where y 1i and y 0j are the (observed) outcomes in the treatment and matched control group, m 1 is the number of treatment observations, n 0 is the number of matched non-treatment observations and w ij is the weight attached to the nontreatment observation j matched to treatment observation i.
In view of the relative large pool of control observations, we use a one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, such that w ij equals one for the non-treatment observation j with the lowest distance to treatment observation i in terms of the propensity score and equals zero otherwise. We impose a caliper of 0.01 to exclude observations relatively distant in terms of the propensity score. 11 To account for duration dependence of the outcome variables, we only match individuals with the same duration of their current spell in public welfare. The matching estimator uses the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to control for selection at the individual level. We justify this assumption on two grounds. First, our dataset comprises rich administrative data on all of the essential aspects to safeguard the CIA. Taking into account the findings by Lechner and Wunsch (2013) , we are confident that we capture the relevant factors that affect both participation in treatment and our outcome variable of interest. In particular, detailed information on individuals' employment histories captures differences in unobservable characteristics such as motivation. 12 Second, most participants are assigned to the program relatively early when they change their status from unemployment insurance (UB I, according to the Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) III) to means-tested public welfare benefits (UB II, according to the SGB II). The change in the type of benefits means that unemployed individuals are assigned to different caseworkers. Therefore, caseworkers in the public welfare system cannot select potential participants on the basis of prior knowledge acquired during the process of counseling. Consequently, participants are predominantly assigned to the program on the basis of the characteristics available to the caseworkers from the same administrative data that we use for the matching estimator. 13 Even if job centers and individual caseworkers have an incentive to include relatively easy-to-integrate individuals ('cream-skimming'), they most likely lack the necessary information to do so.
In addition, we use a cross-sectional version of the difference-in-differencesmatching (DiDM) estimator, similar to Blundell et al. (2004) and Centeno et al. (2009) . The estimator is based on the change in the outcome variables between the treatment and the matched control group between two periods.
For the pretreatment period, we use information for the year 2007, that is, a year in which none of the sample job centers had yet introduced the program. One might also use a later pretreatment period, which would make the common trend assumption more plausible. However, anticipation effects could in turn affect the results if pretreatment periods too close to the treatment start are chosen. Additionally, the later the pretreatment period is, the shorter the 11. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching is only one choice among several available matching methods. The choice of the matching algorithm is not trivial, since it involves a tradeoff between bias and efficiency. The finite sample properties of various matching estimators and their performance differ considerably (Busso et al., 2014; Fr€ olich, 2004; Huber et al., 2014) . However, these studies have not yet arrived at specific conclusions about which estimator should be chosen under which conditions (Imbens, 2015) . As a robustness check, we estimated the model by kernel matching. The differences to our nearest neighbor-matching model were small. 12. For the case of start-up grants, this has been recently confirmed by Caliendo et al. (2017) . 13. We have also checked for this problem by differentiating between job centers where participation is mandatory or voluntary. A possibility for cream-skimming exists only in the latter case.
Since there are no significant differences, we conclude that selection based on unobserved variables does not play a large role.
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We follow Centeno et al. (2009) , which in turn refers back to Smith and Todd (2005) , by implementing the DiDM model sequentially. In a first step, we use matching of the m 1,t treated and n 0,t untreated individuals within period t (2010). In a second step, we use observations for the n 1,tÀ1 unemployed in the sample in (future) treatment regions in t-1 (2007) and form another matched control group. In this case, being in 'treatment' is defined as being a program participant in 2010. In a third step, we identify control observations in 2007 by propensity score matching on the matched control observations from 2010 and the n 0,t-1 potential controls in the non-participating regions. Finally, unconditional difference-in-differences estimation is performed on the basis of these four groups. Weights and outcomes in (2) are defined analogously to equation (1).
While the cross-sectional matching estimator does not account for unobserved heterogeneity, the DiDM estimator does account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity (potentially correlated with treatment and outcomes). 15 Heckman et al. (1997 Heckman et al. ( , 1998 and Smith and Todd (2005) argue that (time-constant) unobserved heterogeneity between regional labor markets may matter substantially for the results. Thus, accounting for regional unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be an important issue.
To provide a benchmark estimator that is not affected by potential selection into the program based on individual unobserved heterogeneity, we also use the difference-in-differences (DiD) method and estimate an intent-to-treat effect of the program. 16 This effect concerns all welfare recipients in the participating and non-participating regions. It is based on the idea that, if the program is effective, this should have an effect on the average outcomes of participants and non-participants in the program regions:
14. During the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, unemployment rose only moderately in Germany. Therefore, the choice of a pretreatment time period before or during the crisis does not affect our results. 15. Since individual outcomes are used, this procedure gets rid of both regional and individual time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. In both periods, treated and untreated individuals differ by both regional and individual characteristics. The matching takes care of the observed part of this, the DiD of the time-constant unobserved part. 16. The term is borrowed from randomized control studies where it refers to a treatment group comprising all subjects who were initially in the treatment group by intention (thence, intent to treat). Since the program usually did not cover the complete eligible population within a job center, the specification of the analysis and the 'intention to treat' would be two different things. In our case, the intent-to-treat analysis compares potentially treated individuals to definitely non-treated individuals. Thus, we compare all individuals in treated job centers to all individuals in untreated job centers.
The DiD estimator does not use the information on individual participation, but is based on all n 1,t > m 1,t unemployed in the treatment regions and the period after treatment. Hence, it does not rest on the CIA with respect to individual treatment status. However, it requires common trends between participating and non-participating regions. Table 2 shows the distribution of regional characteristics that influence local labor market conditions. The standardized differences are small in most cases, so that the size of the potential biases, can be considered small or not existent. As in the DiDM approach, we exploit changes in program participation at the job center level over time, i.e., the gradual process of entry of job centers into the federal program, as depicted in Figure 1 . We discuss specification issues after we have introduced the data in the following section.
Usually, when testing the underlying assumptions of difference-in-differences estimations, placebo experiments are performed as robustness checks using different pseudo-treatment periods. Unfortunately, we cannot use data before 2007 due to gaps in the information occurring after the introduction of UB II in 2005. Hence, we cannot reproduce the DiD approach in the pretreatment period. However, we can use a different placebo experiment, using a pseudo-treatment group of individuals aged 43-47 years, who could not participate in the program. 17 The effect of the program should be zero, or at least not positive for this group, which is confirmed by the data. 18
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The database used for this study consists of two parts. As mentioned in Section 3, the program is not implemented by the Federal Employment Agency but by the BMAS directly. The data on individual participation were, therefore, collected by a private service provider.
This dataset was subsequently merged with the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), an administrative dataset assembled and provided by the Federal Employment Agency. Detailed information on a random sample from the IEB can be found in Dorner et al. (2010) . We can observe a large number of control variables and are able to track all observations for several years. A discussion based on the data and their use in the evaluation of ALMPs is provided by Lechner and Wunsch (2013), whom we also follow in the preparation of the data, especially in generating employment histories originating from spell data. 19 17. Due to discretion by the employees of the job centers, there are individuals aged 48-49 who participate in the program. We therefore chose a younger group for the placebo test. Nevertheless, the placebo group may be indirectly affected by the program, either negatively due to displacement or substitution effects of younger by older workers or positively due to positive spillover effects (e.g., due to an increase in organizational capacity) extending to younger workers. Unfortunately, we have no evidence on the relevance of these effects and we cannot ascertain which of them dominates. Hence, these findings should be interpreted with care. 18. The results can be found in IAQ/IAW (2012, 173f.). 19. In addition to the standard information in the IEB, we use the retention indicator which provides information on individual employment status with a shorter delay in publication of only 6 months in order to include more recent information.
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For the evaluation, we used information on a sample of older individuals having entered welfare benefit receipt during their unemployment spells in the sampled regions in 2010 (inflow sample) and compared them to individuals in nonparticipating regions. For the difference-in-differences analysis, we drew an equivalent sample for the pre-treatment year 2007 (see Figure S1 ). The work status of the individuals were tracked over a period of 12-21 months. Our sample consists of over 17,000 unemployed individuals in job centers that joined the program in the second half of 2009 or in the beginning of 2010 (treated regions). Of these individuals, 3,415 or roughly 20% actually participated in the program. In the control regions, which had not joined the program, our sample includes more than 14,000 individuals each, for the years 2007 and 2010. We included only individuals who were (1) between 48 and 65 years of age, (2) dependent on means-tested public welfare benefits for individuals able to work (UB II), and who were (3) unemployed at the time they entered their welfare spells.
It is well-known from the literature that integration into work depends negatively on elapsed unemployment or benefit duration. Figure 3 shows the number of individuals in the sample who entered the program, depending on the time they had spent receiving welfare benefits. Formally, participants have to receive unemployment benefits (UB II). To be eligible to receive UB II, individuals must have exhausted their claims to Unemployment Benefit I (UB I). In most cases, this means that they have been unemployed for at least a year (depending on age). Individuals who were previously out of the labor force and received (UB I) may have been unemployed for less than a year. Most participants in the sample were assigned to the program relatively early during UB II receipt. The number of entries peaks in the first month of the current welfare spell and declines gradually. Very few new individuals entered the program after more than 180 days of benefit receipt. However, inflow into welfare and inflow into the program balance each other so that in spite of the high inflow rate at the beginning of the welfare spell, access to the program remains fairly constant in our sample from 30-60 60-90 90-120 120-150 150-180 180-210 >210
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Days after entry into welfare receipt Figure 3 Entry into the program by elapsed duration of welfare benefit receipt Note: Based on the 17,193 observations from column 1 of Table 3 . Source: Samples of the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), own calculations.
March to September 2010 (see Figure S2 ). The results show that median duration of total UB II receipt before participation in the program is 15 months, and that only 12.8% were unemployed during the last 10 years. Since we focus on an inflow sample of recent welfare entrants, the results cannot be generalized to the stock of all welfare recipients participating in the program.
The outcome variables of interest are integration into the first labor market and exit from public welfare dependence. We look at the first transition from unemployment to employment and the first exit from welfare dependence as the immediate outcomes, since program participation is necessarily terminated in these two cases. We do not differentiate between part-time and full-time employment as there is no exact information on hours worked in the IEB; however, to be subject to paying contributions, earnings must be above 400 euro per month. Furthermore, we require that employment is not publicly subsidized nor part of a public employment scheme or any other form of active labor market program. This is implemented by excluding all those employment spells which are accompanied by a spell in an active labor market program starting at the same time (this includes all forms of employment subsidies). We allow for inconsistencies in the data by specifying a tolerance of 31 days.
Exit from public welfare (UB II) receipt means the end of a benefit receipt spell as noted in the data. 20 Exit from UB II welfare receipt can occur for various reasons. Apart from integration into employment, the integration of another household member (in particular, the partner) may also lead to a suspension of welfare payments. Similarly, a change in the composition of the household may result in a jump above the threshold defined by means testing. In addition, individuals may be declared unable to work, such that they leave UB II for other kinds of public transfers, for instance social assistance or invalidity benefits. In the data, we are not able to distinguish between these competing risks. Yet, the diversity of exit routes underline that integration into employment and exit from UB II receipt are not two sides of the same coin. Table 3 shows the distribution of characteristics of program participants and non-participants. Column 1 contains the sample means for individuals living in participating regions. Columns 2 and 3 differentiate this group according to individual participation in 'Perspektive 50plus'. Columns 4 and 5 contain sample averages for individuals in non-participating regions and only for the year 2007. Regarding the issue of selectivity into the program, columns 2 and 3 display that participating individuals tended to have somewhat more favorable labor market characteristics than non-participating individuals residing in the same region; for instance, they were on average 1 month longer employed during the years 2006-2008, and they had a lower average incidence and duration of unemployment. The share of males was 4 percentage points higher among participants. Furthermore, participants tended to be older, have a higher likelihood of a university degree, live in smaller households and have a smaller likelihood of having health problems than non-participants. Yet the differences were moderate. This 20. It would be interesting to analyze the degree of public welfare dependence by looking at the amount of benefits received. However, the actual benefit payment depends, in addition to work income, on a number of factors such as the composition of the household or benefit sanctions imposed which cannot be disentangled in the data.
Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working indicates that despite the incentives for job centers by the 'management by objectives' process, the degree of cream-skimming was not too large. At the same time we observed that the differences between individuals in participating and non-participating regions were small as well. Between the years 2007 and 2010, the most important differences were found in the individual labor market histories. This reflects differences in not only labor market conditions but also institutional reforms. In order to be eligible for benefits, individuals able to work had to register as jobseekers from 2005 on, when the Hartz reforms were introduced. Only then could they be long-term unemployed in 2007. This explains why individuals have spent less time in unemployment 5-7 years back in 2010 compared to 2007.
ESTIMATION BASED ON THE CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION

Model specification
This section presents results based on propensity score matching using individual information for the year 2010. In the sample period between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2010, there are 12 months in which a participant can enter the treatment. The propensity score is estimated separately for each calendar month. As participation is binary, estimations of the propensity score are implemented by Probit models.
To estimate the probability of participation, a variety of variables are available at different levels. In our preferred specification of the propensity score, we used all covariates included in Table 3 . 21 In addition, we included dummy variables indicating the industry and occupation of the last employment, and the type of employment (part-time or full-time). We also controlled for a migrants' country of origin in a detailed way. The temporal dimension plays an important role; we wanted to match individuals with the same duration of welfare benefit receipt. This was done by including control observations repeatedly with different durations from the start of the welfare spell until an individual will exit from receiving welfare benefits. 22 As opposed to choosing hypothetical starting dates for the non-treated, we form matching pairs of participating and non-participating individuals with the same benefit duration and observe the outcome from those date (see the discussion in Stephan, 2008) . Moreover, we include the quarter of entry into welfare receipt among the determinants of the propensity score in order to balance any seasonal effects.
In addition to individual characteristics, those of regional labor markets must be included to take into account any remaining variation in job center participation that is not exogenous to the outcome variables. Regional information is linked at the level of job centers to account for the situation in the region: economic performance measured in GDP at market prices per person employed, the 21. The variables used in the propensity score estimation were selected based on the relevant literature that uses similar data such as ours, for example, Lechner and Wunsch (2013) . In addition, the special character of or sample draw makes it possible to use a number of additional variables not available in the standard versions of the IEB. 22. In effect, we match exactly on the duration of the most recent welfare spell (measured in months). proportion of foreigners in the area, the percentage of employees in industry and services, migration rates, the population density, the proportion of the population aged 50-65 years, and the absolute number of unemployed. As for the variables representing the composition of welfare recipients in the job centers, Table 2 shows that these differences are minor and, hence, they are omitted from the specification of the propensity score. Results for the estimated propensity scores are contained in Tables 1-3 in the Supporting Information. In the matching steps, we started with a sample of 17,545 observations (3,415 participated and 14,130 did not participate). For 14,702 of these observations (3,221 participated and 11,481 did not participate), we had sufficient information to estimate a propensity score. Thus, there is a loss of 16% of the observations. Standard balancing tests showed that the performance of propensity score matching is satisfactory in all matching steps (see Table 4 ). Both mean and median bias between treatment and control observations for the covariates were reduced substantially by matching. Re-estimation of the Probit model on the matched sample results in an explained treatment variation in almost zero, as measured by the McFadden-R² and the corresponding LR statistic (Sianesi, 2004 ).
Transitions into unsubsidized employment
The average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) regarding integration into the first labor market (i.e. unsubsidized employment subject to social security contributions) are displayed graphically in Figure 4 . The upper panel contains the results from cross-sectional matching across participating and non-participating regions, the lower panel results from the DiDM estimator. The treatment effects are measured in percentage points for each month after the entry of the individual into the treatment. Confidence bands are calculated using the analytical standard errors proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2011). 23 23. In a robustness check, we have also used kernel matching together with bootstrapped standards errors. The standard errors tended to be smaller than the analytical standard errors (see Figure S5) .
The graph exhibits positive and large treatment effects of program participation on labor market integration on the participating. The DiDM estimator yields slightly smaller treatment effects then the propensity score matching estimator (see lower panel of Figure 4 ). 24 Thus, controlling for regional unobserved heterogeneity changes the results to some extent, but not qualitatively. According to the DiDM results, the ATT is 4.8 percentage points after 90 days in the program. The treatment effect rises to 9.6 percentage points after the first year in the program and declines slightly to 8.8 percentage points at the end of the observation Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working window. However, the number of individuals for whom an effect can be estimated at this duration is relatively small. This can be explained due to a higher confidence of those individuals who entered the program immediatly after starting their welfare spell in January 2010 (see Figure 3 ). After the first year, 45.1% of participating welfare recipients had been integrated. 25 This means that the chance of being integrated rises by 27% due to the program. The lack of a lock-in effect with respect to integration is a notable result. Indeed, the increase in the integration probability is the steepest at the beginning of program participation. This may reflect the fact that the program does not promote measures with a large lock-in potential, such as subsidized employment, public job creation schemes or retraining. 26 We cannot completely rule out, however, that some systematic selection was at work in the initial period of program participation. Since usually program funding depends on the fulfillment of the target integration quota, job centers may had an incentive to raise the quota by including individuals in the program who had already been offered a job by an employer. This would create some upward bias in the treatment effects. The service provider implementing the program noted that this kind of behavior did occur, but there is no evidence of how frequent it is. Figure 5 contains the ATT for the second outcome variable, exit from public welfare (UB II) receipt, arranged in the same way as in the previous graph. The results between matching and DiDM are again similar in direction and magnitude. There is a negative effect on transitions out of welfare dependence during the first months of program participation. The effect is the strongest at the beginning of program participation, with an ATT (estimated by DiDM) of À7.6 after participating for three month in the program. The effect ceases to be statistically significant after eight months and declines in absolute value to À1.0 percentage points after the first year. Towards the end of the observation period, the sign of the ATT seems to have reversed. However, these results fail to be statistically significant.
Exit from UB II welfare receipt
The effects on exit from public welfare receipt in the initial periods of program participation seem to lead to the opposite conclusion than the results for employment. However, a negative effect of the program on exit from welfare receipt is not implausible, even in view of the positive effects on integration. While some individuals leave welfare due to the integration into the labor market, others leave UB II for different reasons. Therefore the first effect can be overcompensated by the second one. For instance, health measures administered to program participants may prevent these individuals from claiming invalidity 25. The relatively high integration rate is due to the fact that we concentrate on new entrants into welfare receipt. These individuals have a much higher integration probability than long-term welfare benefit recipients. In IAQ/IAW (2012), we also report integration rates for a mixed stock/inflow sample of welfare recipients drawn in 2010; the integration rate is less than half as compared to the inflows. 26. A recent example for substantial lock-in effects is contained in the analysis of training vouchers by Doerr et al. (2017). benefits or leaving the workforce altogether. 27 These examples also suggests that the decline of the exit rate from UB II due to the program should not be judged without further qualification. As in the case of integration, systematic selection may also be relevant. In particular, job centers may exclude individuals from participation who are known to change to invalidity or other transfer systems in the near future, because these individuals are unlikely to contribute to the quota. We will come back to the relevance of this argument when we discuss the DiD results further below.
Matching
Difference-in-differences matching Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working
Results for men and women
There is substantial evidence that active labor market policy has different effects according to gender (see, for example, Bergemann and Van den Berg, 2008) . Figure 6 contains results from the same specification as in the lower panels of Figures 4 and 5, but individuals were seperated by gender. 28 The results indicate that the treatment effects on both outcome variables indeed differ between sexes. The ATT on integration into the first labor market is higher for men than for women. After three months (one year), the treatment effect is 5.5 (10.6) percentage points for males and 3.2 (8.1) percentage point for females. The effect for women even remains statistically insignificant for a large part of the duration in the program. In absolute terms, 41.4% of female participants are integrated during the first year after entering the program, while for males the share is 47.3%. Regarding the exit from UB II welfare receipt, the time pattern of the ATT is strikingly different for males and females. The effect on males is strong initially but reverses with the time elapsed after the program start. For women, the effect 28. The propensity scores are also estimated separately for this specification. remains negative and statistically significant over a large part of the observation window.
The gender differences in the two outcomes are consistent insofar as the stronger effect on integration for men helps to pull these individuals out of welfare dependence. As the integration effect is weaker for women, the negative initial effect on exit out of UB II receipt prevails. Another explanation of the gender differences in transfer receipt is based on the male breadwinner model. If women tend to contribute less to household income, they may be more prepared not to pick up transfer benefits they are entitled to. If the program is conferring specific benefits to participants aside from improving their chances on the labor market social inclusion, health treatments and othersthis may constitute a reason why individuals decide not to leave welfare receipt.
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
Specification
In this section, we present estimation results that do not rest on the conditional independence assumption with respect to individual participation. Compared to the previous estimations, we extend the sample to those individuals who have not been treated in the participating regions and individuals who have not been chosen as matching partners. Otherwise, all the features of the sampletime, location, composition of the groupsremain unchanged.
The difference-in-differences estimator represents an intent-to-treat effect (ITT), i.e. the effect of potential rather than actual treatment. The estimated treatment effects are, therefore, smaller in magnitude due to an effect of 'dilution'. To make them numerically comparable to the ATT, we have to divide them by the expected probability of treatment until the observation date. This probability is in the order of 0.2 during much of the observation period. 29 For our estimation, we use a conditional difference-in-differences estimator, accounting for the same characteristics that have been used in the matching model to estimate the propensity scores. We use the same dependent variables as stated earlier. The model is implemented by ordinary least squares using a linear probability model. 30 The main assumptions of the difference-in-differences estimator are the common trends assumption and non-anticipation of treatment assumption (see Lechner, 2012) . The common trends assumption is supported by the fact that regional characteristics are similar in the treatment and control groups (see Table 2 ). Regarding non-anticipation, jobseekers may have had knowledge of the program prior to its introduction in their job center because it existed in other regions. Thus, it is possible that individuals anticipated the introduction of the program. If they disliked the prospect of joining the program, they could have tried hard to leave unemployment before, i.e. there could have been a 'threat 29. The formula is ATT t ¼ ITT t =P t0;t , where P t0;t is the expected probability of treatment until the observation date. 30. As a robustness check, we have also performed non-linear probit models, where the treatment effect is estimated accordingly to Puhani (2012) . The results are similar to the ones presented using a linear probability model (see Supporting Information, Figure S7 ).
Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working effect' in the preprogram period. The opposite ('waiting effect') could also be possible. However, such anticipation effects are only possible in the short run, that is, several weeks or months before the start of the treatment. In our analysis, anticipation of treatment was not an issue because our observations for the pretreatment period lie years ahead of potential entry (see Figure S1 ). Therefore, this effect should not influence the results.
Estimation results
Estimation results are displayed in Figure 7 . The upper panel shows integration into unsubsidized employment. The time scale is measured here from the start of UB II welfare benefit receipt, not program participation, which has to be accounted for when comparing the results with those reported earlier.
Compared to the matching and DiD-matching results, we find much smaller effects of about 1 percentage point at maximum. Moreover, the effect remains statistically insignificant throughout the observation period. To some part, the small magnitude reflects the intent-to-treat effect, i.e. the effect of a job center entering the program on all older unemployed, not only the participants. However, given a participation rate of about 20%, the ATT of actual participation would still be in the range of only 5 percentage points, which is substantially smaller than the ATT reported in the previous section.
A negative effect is found for welfare benefit receipt, similar to the results of matching and DiDM. The magnitude of the effect is 1.9 percentage points, which corresponds quite closely to the magnitude of the ATT in Figure 5 . The effect is also statistically significant starting in the third month and from there ongoing.
The difference in time patterns visible in Figure 7 compared to Figures 4 and 5 is easily explained. While entry into the program occurs mostly in the first months of the welfare spell (see Figure S1 ), a substantial fraction of treated observations enter after more than 2 months of welfare benefit duration. The treatment effects in the DiD estimations were measured from the start of welfare benefit receipt, while they were measured from the start of program entry in the PSM and DiDM estimations. Hence we had to account for the delay in program entry when interpreting the results.
From the regression results (not reported), we note substantial time effects. Depending on elapsed benefit duration, the time effect reaches a magnitude of about 11 percentage points. This large effect clearly increases the relevance of the assumptions inherent in the specification of the DiD model, in particular linearity, and it clearly makes the results less robust to potential specification changes. This is much less the case in the DiDM approach, where the magnitudes of the treatment and time effects are similar. The differences in the outcomes between treated and non-treated regions are mostly below 1 percentage point.
The DiD effects on integration are substantially lower than those estimated for the participants using matching or DiDM. This could be the result of non-participants being adversely affected by the program due to displacement and substitution. There is also the possibility that matching and DiDM results suffer from (positive) selectivity not accounted for by the covariates included in the propensity score. It is not clear to which degree the difference between the results is driven by both issues. Previous studies on the basis of more comprehensive data, such as Lechner and Wunsch (2013) and Caliendo et al. (2017) have performed additional analysis to further separate selectivity and behavior. Their results suggest that the covariates included in our estimations are sufficient to avoid selectivity. Therefore, we favor indirect effects as an explanation for the differences. 31 The effects on exit from UB II welfare benefit receipt, in contrast, are consistent between the different approaches. Spillover effects to the non-treatment Figure 7 Estimated intent-to-treat effects Note: Dependent variable: (a) probability to have started an unsubsidized employment spell at time t. (b) probability to have left unemployment benefits (ALG II) receipt at time t. Source: Samples of the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), own calculations. 31 . In further analysis, we compared the results obtained from two control groups: first, non-participants from participating job centers, and second, non-participants from non-participating job centers. If the results differed, this could indicate displacement effects. However, the results (see Supporting Information, Figure S7) show only minor but non-zero differences, pointing to the relevance of displacement effects.
Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working group are less likely in this case. The similarity of the results suggests that the kind of selectivity mentioned in the previous section does not play a big role here and that the estimated treatment effects are indeed due to changes in behavior.
INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of our analysis point to positive treatment effects of program participation on the integration of older unemployed into the labor market using several different estimation methods. The size of the coefficients obtained from matching and difference-in-differences matching estimations is large. The difference-in-differences approach used as an alternative framework yields somewhat smaller effects. Our favored explanation for these differences is the presence of displacement effects between beneficiaries and non-participants.
The results regarding the chance of leaving dependence on means-tested unemployment benefits are consistent between alternative estimators. The program unambiguously reduces the intensity of transitions out of welfare receipt, in particular, during the first months after entry into the program. A shortcoming of the data of the Federal Employment Agency is that we cannot track individuals once they leave the means-tested welfare system for the unemployed. Individuals who exit welfare receipt of UI II could be self-employed, could be civil servants, could leave the labor force or could exit into (early) retirement. Since it is not possible to observe the destination states of individuals, it is difficult to attach a behavioral interpretation to the findings. Looking behind this closed curtain could be a topic of future research. It does seem plausible, however, that the benefits conveyed by the program such as social inclusion, health services and others reduce the incentive to turn to other forms of social transfers. It would be interesting whether this could explain the differences between the two main outcomes. From a policy perspective, it would be interesting to know to what extent the program keeps older individuals in the labor force, preventing premature transitions into early retirement. Due to the lack (at present) of a unified database, the interaction of different interventions in different policy domains (such as ALMP and disability pensions) has been relatively rarely addressed; further research on this topic seems highly desirable.
Our results may be related to previous findings regarding the effect of similar policies. First, our results confirm the positive effects found for other programs of intensive counseling and job search assistance. Second, we find relatively large effects for a disadvantaged or hard-to-place group of unemployed. In comparison with the existing literature, it appears that the effectiveness of similar programs is different for younger and older unemployed. However, it is not possible to attribute this finding causally to age. Older workers may have specific needs that set them aside from other jobseekers but they may also comprise individuals with particularly severe labor market obstacles who have, incidentally, grown older. Disentangling these reasons for treatment heterogeneity may be an interesting issue for future research.
All treatment effects refer to the group of recent entrants into means-tested public welfare benefits and cannot be generalized to all welfare recipients. Recent entrants are likely to be relatively close to the labor market. Whether counseling and case-working might be effective even for long-term welfare recipients is a question of high policy relevance. While the results presented here suggest that programs directed at the transition into the first labor market may work for some older individuals, this may not be true for those longest out of the labor market. For this group, other approaches may still be required.
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Coaching, Counseling, Case-Working © 2018 German Economic Association (Verein f€ ur Socialpolitik) e467 Figure S5 . Matching results using kernel matching and bootstrapped standard errors Integration into the first labor market. Figure S6 . Comparison of different control groups. Figure S7 . Estimated intent-to-treat effects (Probit specification). Integration into the first labor market. Table S1 . Recent Evidence on ALMPs for Older Unemployed. Table S2 . Estimation results for the propensity score (Step 1). Treated individuals: participants of "Perspektive 50plus". Non-treated individuals: individuals aged 50+ in non-participating regions. Table S3 . Estimation results for the propensity score (Step 2). Treated individuals: participants of "Perspektive 50plus". Non-treated individuals: individuals aged 50+ in the participating regions in 2007. Table S4 . Estimation results for the propensity score (Step 3). Treated individuals: matched non-participants of "Perspektive 50plus" in treated regions in 2007. Non-treated individuals: individuals aged 50+ in non-participating regions in 2007.
